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Is N ature Enough? M eaning and Truth in the A ge o f  Science, by John F. Haught. 
Cambridge University Press, 2006. 223 pages. $70.00 (hardback), $19.99 
(paperback).
PAUL C. ANDERS, University of Wisconsin-Madison
In this book, John Haught argues that, due to the limitations of scientific 
explanation, no one science, nor all sciences taken as a whole, can give ul­
timate explanations of the natural world. Therefore, scientific naturalism 
is irrational in that it actually undermines the scientific enterprise. Much 
in these claims needs clarification. Haught understands naturalism to be 
a worldview consisting in the metaphysical beliefs that the natural world 
is all that exists, and so, nature is self-originating and purposeless. Fur­
thermore, life and mind are unintended evolutionary accidents, and there 
is "no reasonable prospect for conscious human survival beyond death" 
(p. 9). In addition, scientific naturalism includes the epistemological beliefs 
that all causes are natural causes open in principle to scientific investiga­
tion, and that all features of life, including human life and production, can 
be ultimately explained in scientific (evolutionary) terms. Haught is clear 
to distinguish scientific naturalism from science, the latter being "a fruitful 
but self-limiting way of learning some things about the world" (p. 6).
Haught sees in scientific naturalism a kind of explanatory monism, 
which expresses the belief that all explanations of natural phenomena 
must be scientifically accessible, explanations cohering to and arising out 
of the scientific method. He rejects this view of explanation, arguing that 
a multi-layered account, or explanatory pluralism, is required for even 
approaching an "ultimate" explanation of any natural phenomena. His 
argument consists in discussing certain "easily accessible" features of the 
natural world (e.g., religion, intelligence, life, and emergence). He de­
scribes how these features would be explained from the perspective of 
scientific naturalism, and then raises doubts about whether such explana­
tions "can ever lead to the fullest possible understanding of the particular 
phenomena in question" (p. 20).
Haught's argument for rejecting scientific naturalism focuses on two 
main ideas: that mentality (subjectivity) is a product of the natural world; 
and that the anticipatory nature of mind is not distinct from the natural 
world, but only the most prominent expression to date of the fundamental 
makeup of the cosmos itself. The link between mind and nature is the focal 
point of his critique. Since mind is an emergent part of the natural world, 
and so understanding mind allows us to more fully understand the nature 
of the universe, mind must be a primary focus of any "ultimate" under­
standing of nature. However, according to Haught, science cannot admit 
the study of the subjective mind. For this reason, a scientific approach to 
nature cannot fu lly  explain any natural phenomenon. He argues, "What 
naturalism overlooks, . . . is that you can understand the universe in depth 
only if you take into account, starting with yourself, the subjective "in­
sideness" of nature that science usually leaves out of consideration. A full 
understanding of the universe is inseparable from the project of coming to 
terms with your own critical intelligence" (p. 29).
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Critical intelligence, an emergent property in nature, is the fundamental 
feature of subjectivity. Following the work of Bernard Lonergan, Haught 
lays out what he takes to be the "cognitional structure" of mind. Describ­
ing the cognitive make-up of the mind, Haught insists, "your mind cannot 
help passing through the three distinct but complementary acts: experi­
ence, understanding and judgment. This is because there are persistent 
and ineradicable imperatives at the foundation of your consciousness" 
(p. 33). The imperatives and the cognitional acts that go with them are 
the outflow of what Haught refers to as "the desire to know." The desire 
to know produces the imperatives to be attentive, intelligent, critical, and 
responsible. These imperatives give rise to the cognitional acts of experi­
ence, understanding, judgment, and decision, respectively.
The desire to know, according to Haught, is fundamentally anticipa­
tory. Critical intelligence expresses the desire to attain truth. Following 
the imperatives of the mind, critical intelligence anticipates and searches 
for truth that is independent of the mind. It is following the imperatives 
of the mind that has given rise to scientific inquiry. But science alone can­
not explain how, or why, these imperatives to attain truth emerged. Since 
scientific naturalism limits explanation to science alone, the scientific nat­
uralist cannot explain why one should engage in science.
Haught argues that science (i.e., evolutionary theory) alone cannot ex­
plain critical intelligence because, on a naturalist account, the anticipatory 
desire to know truth cannot be adaptive. Evolutionary theory, as with all 
science, seeks to explain complex phenomena via simpler, antecedent phe­
nomena. However, the anticipation of truth that is fundamental to critical 
intelligence is a forward-looking aspect of mind. Here, Haught must be 
differentiating an instrumental use of the ability to anticipate future oc­
currences based on the law-like regularities in nature, which clearly seems 
highly adaptive, from a desire to know the world as it actually exists. Ac­
cording to Haught, critical intelligence is only adaptive if there is an ulti­
mate (final or everlasting) truth to which it is drawn. Since nature, being 
contingent, cannot give rise to ultimate truth, an evolutionary explanation 
of critical intelligence requires a wider perspective than scientific natural­
ism allows. Furthermore, since mind is a feature of the natural world, the 
anticipatory nature of mind must be attributed to all of nature. If this is the 
case, then scientific explanation in general requires a wider perspective 
than scientific naturalism allows. Therefore, scientific naturalism should 
be rejected.
Haught goes into much more detail in trying to defend, for example, 
his claim that mind is fundamentally anticipatory. He discusses, following 
Bergson, Polanyi, Whitehead, Lonergan and Teilhard, the need for a "rich­
er empiricism" that would bring subjectivity under the purview of science. 
He considers important issues concerning the interaction of science and 
religion such as morality, suffering, and death. There is definitely much to 
commend in Haught's goals and his attempts to achieve those goals.
However, there are also some problematic positions taken. I would like 
to focus on two in the space I have left. First, while I agree with Haught's 
call for explanatory pluralism, there are problems with his depiction of 
how different levels of explanation are related. Haught uses an example 
of a pot of water boiling. To the question, "Why is the water boiling?"
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one can respond by explaining how heat excites the molecules of the wa­
ter, "thus causing a transition from a liquid to a gaseous state." Haught 
continues, "A second way to answer the question is to say the water is 
boiling 'because I turned on the gas burner.' And still a third response is 
to say that the water is boiling 'because I want tea'" (pp. 70-71). Haught 
claims that these different levels of explanation are, and must be, logically 
distinct explanations in that they "cannot be reduced to or mapped onto 
one another." He goes on: "Each [explanation] adds something important 
to an understanding of why the water is boiling, and it does so without 
conflicting or competing with the others" (p. 71). The first and third expla­
nations of why the water is boiling are analogous to scientific and theologi­
cal explanations, respectively, of such phenomena as why there is life, or 
why there exists anything at all. While science can give a thoroughgoing 
explanation of how life arose, there is room for a theological explanation 
alongside the scientific.
However, a problem arises here for Haught's account. We can give vari­
ous accounts of why the water is boiling because we have access to a varied 
set of data. First, through science, we have access to how heat affects the 
movement of molecules. Second, through introspection, we have access to 
our desires and how they affect our actions. This is clearly disanalogous 
with explanations as to why there is life. While we have scientific access to 
the phenomenon of life, Haught gives no account of how we might have 
theological access to the phenomenon. It seems Haught is looking to sci­
ence to guide theological explanation. He warns, "Theology must avoid 
any attempt to make room for divine action in yet uncharted scientific 
territory" (p. 70). However, if these two kinds of explanation are "logically 
distinct" in the way Haught argues, scientific explanation will give little 
guidance for developing theological explanation. Access to our own sub­
jectivity also seems of little help unless we have some reason for equating, 
or claiming strong similarity between, our own and a divine mind. While 
the notion of layered explanation is important, Haught gives no account 
of what might justify explanations at a theological level.
This leads to the second problematic aspect of Haught's account that I 
would like to discuss. Since theological explanations are closer to ultimate 
explanations than any scientific claim can be, Haught argues that they are 
necessarily more vague and metaphorical. While this may very well be 
true, it does not follow thereby that theological explanations need not be 
grounded in clear, literal truths. To say "Jesus is the rock of my salvation," 
is clearly to make a metaphorical claim. Yet, this claim only has mean­
ing if it can be conceptually linked to some literal understanding. Here, 
the claim has meaning given the understanding that solid rock is the best 
foundation on which to build any substantial structure. A link to literal 
understanding is missing in much of Haught's discussion.
This problem is most clearly seen in Haught's notion of anticipation. 
Haught describes the universe as anticipatory in nature. This is clearly 
metaphorical. How are we to understand this metaphor? Haught links 
the anticipatory nature of the cosmos to the anticipatory nature of critical 
intelligence. But, critical intelligence is an aspect of subjective conscious­
ness. How is the universe anticipatory though non-conscious? Haught 
suggests this anticipation is seen in the universe's openness to future
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possibilities. This openness is shown, for example, in the emergent prop­
erties of life and mind. But, anticipation as openness to possibilities is 
simply contingency. It seems Haught's point is simply that the universe 
has a contingent future. However, Haught seems to want much more 
conveyed by his notion of anticipation, but what exactly is unclear. For 
example, much of what Haught suggests has an Aristotelian flavor in 
each existing thing being drawn to imitate an unmoved mover. This is 
not the kind of theological explanation to which Haught ascribes. Yet, 
there seems little in his notion of anticipation that will help him distin­
guish his conclusions from such an explanation.
One way of understanding Haught's account is as a Plantingian critique 
of evolutionary naturalism from within a process theological approach. 
As such this is an interesting synthesis of divergent approaches to natural 
theology. Whether Haught has moved that critique forward is too complex 
an issue for me to treat in this review. The problems I have tried to identify 
in Haught's account stem from difficulties basic to the natural theological 
enterprise—from where do we obtain our theological concepts, how does 
our theological language contact our everyday experience. Haught's is an 
interesting attempt to deal with these difficulties.
A theism : A  Very Short Introduction, by Julian Baggini. Oxford University 
Press, 2004. Pp. 119. US $9.95 (paperback).
AGNALDO CUOCO PORTUGAL, University of Brasilia, Brazil
It is a short but very provocative book. The aim is to provide atheists with 
a thought organizer and a handy, quick explanation of their ideas for non­
atheists. This ambitious goal of defending a whole worldview in such a 
short book is pursued in six chapters and a conclusion, in addition to some 
references and indications for further reading.
The first and the second chapters are the most important. Chapter one 
is dedicated to a clarification of what atheism is about. Baggini proposes 
that we overcome the prejudice not only that atheism is evil and threaten­
ing, but also that it is essentially a negative position, parasitic on postula­
tions of supernatural/transcendental realities. According to him, there is 
a positive stance that better characterizes the view he is defending, which 
he calls 'atheist physicalism' (p. 6). According to atheist physicalism, only 
the natural world exists, and the stuff of the natural world is essentially 
physical, which means that spirits, souls, and ideas detached from physi­
cal apparatuses are not part of the world. Baggini stresses, however, that 
this position should not be taken as a form of eliminative materialism, 
according to which anything that is not physical or material does not 
exist. Although atheist physicalism postulates that there is only physical 
matter in the universe, it also claims that out of that sole substance come 
minds, beauty, love, and 'the full gamut of phenomena that gives richness 
to human life' (p. 6). In summary, atheism is a form of naturalism and 
physicalism rather than a negative view dedicated to denying religion.
